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WHY I CANT TEACH CUSTOMARY LAW
Julie E. Stewart
Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe
EXPLAINING THE TITLE
From the outset it is important to note that my inability to teach customary law is not an 
absolute "can't" but a relative "can't". A more accurate, but less tantalizing, title would 
have been: "W hy I try not to teach customary law within a positivist general law 
framework".
TEACHING CUSTOMARY LAW
Historically within law curricula in the Southern African region the bulk of teaching on 
African customary law has tended to be on the captured and formalised versions that are 
recorded in the law reports, built upon and interpreted through an Anglo-Saxon or Roman 
Dutch law procedural and substantive law filter.
A different starting point for devising curricula, is that customary law is a dynamic living 
system that has the capacity to enrich and inform the other systems of law with which it 
interacts within a given legal system. This requires a pedagogic approach that investigates 
the jurisprudence of custom. It postulates that customary law should be approached as a 
system of cohesive laws with underlying guiding principles that need to be identified, 
recognised as a source of jurisprudence, their content sensitively explored. It is to this 
latter approach that I have come to subscribe.
Thus whether or not I can teach customary law has become a matter of the content of what 
is to be taught and the sources from which that content is drawn. If the content is to be the 
positivist versions of customary law as captured in the textbooks on customary law and 
the precedents in the law reports, then I am ethically bound to critique it at every turn. I 
can teach it in the technical sense, arguably that is a relatively easy task as it is pre-digested, 
ordered and homogenised as a coherent set of hierarchical rules, usually arranged in 
accordance with pre-existing general law subject divisions. It is frequently presented as a 
sub-class of general law, either within specific subject areas such as Family Law, Delict, 
Property Law and Succession Law or as a single subject, Customary Law. In this version 
the relevant legislation, choice of law rules, procedural issues and substantive law "rules" 
teased out of the cases, across the whole gamut of recognised customary law topics, are 
addressed. There is, increasingly, less of this version of customary law to teach. Legislative 
intervention is consistently intervening in the construction of customary law to the point 
where if the matter is to be adjudicated in the courts it may well be regulated by statute, 
which by its very nature ceases to be customary even if it is a statute regulating or amending 
customary law.1 So that a focus on this as African Customary Law is a misnaming of the
1 The customary law (in the books) of inheritance in Zimbabwe, which forms the backdrop to this 
paper, has since been significantly changed by legislative intervention. The Administration of Estates 
Amendment Act 6 of 1997, now prescribes how the intestate estates of persons to whom customary 
law is applicable shall be distributed. In general it is a reflection of the principles that underlie local 
customs and practices. However, it is no longer customary law but statute. It is instantly ossified law.
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content of the law as once legislation intervenes the content is general law .2 Just as I can 
teach the Zimbabweanised Roman Dutch Law of Succession, so I could teach the "Roman 
Dutchised" Zimbabwean Customary Law of Succession, but it is not a version which accords 
with the customs and practices of the peoples of Zimbabwe. However this all begs the 
question as to what it is that ought to be taught.
THE NEED TO RESEARCH CUSTOMARY LAW
Reconsidering the thrust and content of syllabi for the teaching of customary law has its 
origins in the research into, and reconsideration of customary law as a dynamic living 
system of law that affects the lives of the majority of the population of Zimbabwe. Even 
where the general law is purportedly applicable in family, inheritance, land, environmental 
or other matters it is trite that the direct or indirect influence of local customs and practices 
affects the way in which such matters will be resolved (Dengu-Zvobgo et al; Ncube and 
Stewart, 1995).
SI of the Zimbabwe, Customary Law and Local Courts Act defines "customary law" as:
[t]he customary law of the people of Zimbabwe, or any section or community of such 
people, before the 10th of June, 1891, as modified and developed since that date.
Although the first part of the definition seems to refer to an ossified version of custom for 
which it would be difficult to obtain an accurate version of its 10th of June 1891 content, 
there is room for recognition of customs oft stated dynamism. In fact the section demands 
research into the development and modification of customary law since 1891. In other 
words there is a need to re-examine custom as an internal exercise as well as an external 
exercise.
National constitutions, legal systems and the mode and extent of the recognition of 
customary law create their own considerations of how customary law should and can be 
addressed as a system of law.
S89 of the Zimbabwe Constitution provides for the recognition of customary law, the 
effective extent of such recognition being regulated by other statutes, as is the purported 
content of the customary law to be applied by the courts. The current recognition statute, 
the Customary Law and Local Courts Act, Chapter 7:05, provides for the application of 
customary law as follows:
s3 Subject to this Act and any other enactment, unless the justice of the case otherwise 
requires -
a) custom ary law  shall apply in any civil case where -
i) the parties have expressly agreed that it shall apply; or
ii) regard being had to the nature of the case and the surrounding circumstances, 
it appears that the parties have agreed that it should apply; or
iii) regard being had to the nature of the case and the surrounding circumstances, 
it appears just and proper that it should apply;
b) the general law of Zimbabwe should apply in any other case . . .
However, it is reasonable to assume that many estates or substantial portions of estates will continue 
to be dealt with by families outside the bounds of the statute.
2 It might be argued that my agenda will be overtaken by legislative intervention, even if this is to be 
the case the nature and form of legislative intervention needs to be informed by a thorough 
understanding of what is to be reformed. Arguably a thorough understanding and reinterpretation 
of custom might obviate legislative change.
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There are also statutes which prescribe that customary law or the customs and practices of 
the tribe or people to which a person belonged should govern a particular matter. Such as 
s68 of the Administration of Estates Act, Chapter 7:05;3 the Customary Marriages Act, 
Chapter 5:07; sl2  of the Wills Act, Chapter 6:06; s8 of the Communal Land Act, Chapter 
20:04.
The processes to be followed in determining the content of customary law are prescribed 
by statute as with s9 of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act, Chapter 7:06:
If a court entertains any doubt as to the existence of or content of a rule4 of customary  
law relevant to any proceedings, after having considered such submissions thereon 
as may be made and such evidence thereof as may be tendered by or on behalf of the 
parties, it may without derogation from any other lawful source to which it may have 
recourse, consult reported cases, text books and other sources, and may receive 
opinions, either orally or in writing to enable it to arrive at a decision in the 
m a tte r. . .
The section is worded sufficiently broadly to permit the review of the content of custom. 
Thus it can be argued that the Zimbabwean unified legal system is suitably constructed for 
a thorough review of the nature and form of one of its major component systems of law, 
customary law.
CUSTOMARY LAW REFORM: AN INSIDER JOB?
Putting customary law through the constitutional sieve, that is determining whether it 
measures up to the criteria stipulated in Bills of Rights is one way to reform customary law 
(Bennett, 1995). However it still remains a reform of the customary law on the books. In 
the Zimbabwean context even this is not possible as customary law is a protected species. 
S23 of the Zimbabwean Constitution, as recently amended by s9 of Act 14 of 1996, provides 
that there may not be discrimination in any written law or by a public authority on the 
grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or gender, except 
where such is necessary by reason of physiological difference between the genders.
The relevant portions of s23, as amended, provide:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section —
(a) no law shall make any provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in 
effect; and
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting 
by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any 
public office or any public authority . . .
However, this does not provide a basis for putting customary law through the constitutional 
sieve and ridding it of its supposed discriminatory elements as s23(3) provides:
Nothing contained in any law shall be,held to be in contravention of subsection of 
(1 )(a) to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matters —
3 This section has now been replaced by the provisions of s3 of the Administration of Estates Amendment 
Act 6 of 1997. A discussion of the effect of this amendment lies well beyond the scope of this paper.
4 . Rule may have been an inappropriate word to use in this context, the preferable word would probably
have been principle of customary law. (Rwezaura et al, Stewart, 1997 (Methodology). It has been 
postulated that rule collection may have been a significant source of misconstruction of custom in 
that the end rules from general principles were collected rather than the underlying principles (Dengu 
Zvobgo et al).
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a) adoption, marriage, divorce, devolution of property on death or other matters of 
personal law;
b) the application of African customary law in any case involving Africans or an 
African and one or more persons who are not Africans where such persons have 
consented to the application of African customary law in that case . . .
f) the according to tribespeople to the exclusion of other persons of rights and 
privileges relating to communal land.
If customary law is to be reformed or revisited within the existing Zimbabwean 
constitutional and legal frameworks, using constitutional provisions is not the way, at 
present. Clearly other modes have to be found and, to some extent, this was a driving force 
behind the reconsideration of the content and form of customary law as a potentially 
dynamic part of the legal system which could be the source of its own transformation.
As a Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) and Women's Law researcher, my entry 
point into this terrain is determined by having to make grounded appraisals of women's 
experiences of the different versions of customary law and how these assist or hinder them 
to access resources (Ncube et al, 1997 (b)).
After some preliminary forays into the field and analysis of findings, it seemed clear that at 
least some of the customary law on the ground as used among the people was, surprisingly, 
consistent with notions of gender equity. So from the initial stages of the research process 
it was clear that this was a research and reform agenda that would bear fruit. There was 
also an appreciation that even if certain customs were problematic, at the very least one, 
we would have an understanding of the social and cultural milieu to be addressed if reform 
was to take place in accordance with human rights paradigms (Tsanga, 1997).
OLD PRINCIPLES; NEW SOLUTIONS
The underlying hypothesis in this paper is that customary law as captured and applied in 
the formal legal system began as little more than a collection of end result determinations 
as pronounced by tribal authorities or as generalisations about outcomes at the level of 
rules recounted to early researchers (Rwezaura et al, Armstrong et al). This hypothesis 
incorporates the notion that what may have been missed in these collection processes are 
the underlying social values that translate into general guiding principles that informed 
the decision making processes of traditional judicial authorities (Dengu-Zvobgo et al). There 
has been a great deal written about those old collection processes and about the dynamism 
of custom, but often the critiques stop at that point (Bennett, 1995). These critiques have to 
be transformed into research into the development of customary law at all levels, be it the 
courts, state administration, or the versions current among the people. The findings from 
such research have to be turned into legal action. Students cannot be treated as the end 
consumers of the research product, they have to be skilled in doing, case by case if necessary, 
their own research into customs and practices on the ground.
RESEARCH, DIALOGUE AND REFORM; AN ILLUSTRATION
A meeting in 1996 with chiefs, from different provinces and ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, 
Ministry of Justice officials and women's organisations to discuss proposed amendments 
to the laws of inheritance in Zimbabwe illustrates the importance of sound background 
research into the jurisprudence that underlies custom. The resolution of the discussion 
and the form that any amendments to the law might take turned on whether there were 
underlying principles that guided determinations in inheritance disputes or whether there
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was an irrefrangible rule that the eldest son was his father's heir as held by the Supreme 
Court in cases such as Mudzinganyama v Ndambakuwa S-50-93.
The President of the Council of Chiefs and Member of Parliament, Chief Mangwende, 
when asked whether there was the underlying principle of customary law in inheritance 
matters replied that the overarching principle was that the family of the deceased especially 
wives and children, but not excluding husbands, had to be provided for from the property 
previously within the command of the deceased person. There was universal agreement 
among the Chiefs present on this principle regardless of ethnic group. Where the difference 
lay was in the way that this could be accomplished.
Chief Mangwende saw the way in which this could be carried out was by leaving the 
property in the hands of the surviving spouse. A married couple, regardless of the form of 
the marriage, were, in his view, a productive unit and there was no notion of division until 
after the surviving spouse had died. Formal status would be transmitted to the eldest son 
but the property and its daily management should remain with the surviving spouse, in 
this context the wife. There was an elderly chief, from the Gweru area, who could not 
accept that a woman would have the necessary managerial capacity and skills to carry out 
the tasks required. His view was that a son or a male relative needed to be in general 
control. However, even in his case the underlying principle was not disputed, it was the 
mode of its accomplishment that was in dispute. The rest of the chiefs, some 12 in all, 
subscribed to Chief Mangwende's approach to the matter but with room for variation 
depending on specific family situations.
The principle had remained static. The best interests of the remnant family of the deceased 
person predominated, but the manner of its realisation was subject to constant pragmatic 
variation. The end result determinations are therefore likely to be different from era to era 
and place to place but this does not disturb the principle.
Asking what was the principle behind customary inheritance practices was a calculated 
risk. However, it was one that was informed as to the likely response to the question. 
Suffice it to say that this turned the tide of the meeting which was at risk of being bogged 
down in a plethora of demands for reform from the women and a cultural defensive stand 
from the men. The meeting then, to the surprise of many, redivided its alliances into women's 
organisations and the chiefs on one side and the "other" men defending patrilineal end 
rule oriented views of women's inheritance rights on the opposing side. This redivision 
proved critical in achieving reforms of the law that affirmed women's acknowledged 
customary entitlement to significant rights in their deceased husbands' estates.5 The battle 
had been being waged on a number of fronts — one to transform the interpretations of 
customary law through the superior courts, the second to improve women's lot through 
legislative intervention.6 The latter came first and was not to be quibbled over because of 
the significant benefits conferred on widows. However, it is now an uncustomary reflection 
of customary principles. »
In the empirical data generated by the WLSA research into inheritance there are similar 
examples that illustrate this principle versus rule construction of customary law. Families, 
chiefs and ordinary individuals in rural and urban Mashonaland and Matabeleland, stated 
that the care and protection of the family of the deceased person was at the centre of
5 See S3 of the Administration of Estates Act, Amendment Act 6 of 1997.
6 The legislative intervention does not obviate the need to further explore customary law in this area 
as there will still be estates to be handled and fought over that are governed by the previous law.
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customary practices of inheritance. In Nkayi in Matabeleland it was stressed that the 
surviving spouse remained in control and possession of the family land allocation for their 
own benefit, that cattle would be made available to a widow for her own use. Cattle and 
other movable property, once the needs of the spouse had been satisfied, would be 
distributed in different proportions to the children according to need and according to 
whether they had received previous allocations of resources on marriage or for other 
purposes.7 The youngest son of a deceased male might take over the duty of assisting his 
mother and seeing to her daily needs. The eldest son would inherit his father's status and 
overall responsibility for the family, but not the land allocation which would ultimately 
pass to the youngest son. If the union was polygynous then it was the youngest son of the 
respective houses who would acquire the responsibility for assisting his mother and the 
eldest son of the most senior house would probably become the heir to his father's status8 
(Dengu-Zvobgo et al, 1994).
The Zimbabwe Supreme Court held in Vareta v Vareta S-126-90 and later in Mwazozo v 
Mwazozo S-121-94, reversing the decision in Chihowa v Mangwende S-84-87, that a daughter 
cannot inherit from her father's intestate estate under either Ndebele or Shona customary 
law. However, both Ndebele and Shona custom, on the ground, is far more pragmatic.
One of my neighbours died and was survived by only female children. We distributed 
his many cattle and other property among his daughters. The brothers and other close 
relatives of the deceased decided on this and the rest of us and the community had no 
problems with it as it is our custom  —  Headman M uziwapansi, Nkayi district, 
Matebeleland (Dengu-Zvobgo et al, 1994).
In Bulawayo urban areas a discernible trend was for the family to try and arrange for the 
family home to be transferred to the surviving widow. This was usually not problematic 
until the matter was to be dealt with by the courts where the formal pronouncement would 
be made that the eldest son was the heir. Even where this took place, the son might be 
prevailed on to transfer the property to his mother. This was explained as being in 
accordance with custom.
In Mashonaland similar pragmatic processes were uncovered, where intestate heirs to 
commercial immovable property, appointed according to the provisions of S6A of the 
Customary Law and Primary Courts Act,9 tried as far as possible not to disturb the 
occupation rights of widows, leaving them in occupation and control of commercial land 
holdings. Chief Mazungunye from Bikita interviewed during the field research stated that:
the essence of custom was to care for the family of the deceased, using the land or 
whatever resources were available. . .  Thus the appointment of the heir, if one was to 
be appointed, had to focus on the welfare of the fam ily rather than on som e 
predetermined formula (Dengu-Zvobgo et al, 1994).
Local customs and practices were, when applied in accordance with the underlying 
principles of customary law, not necessarily inimical to the rights of women. Rather, they 
were already in advance of the reform agendas.
7 This is a good example of the fairness and equity principle among children. There is also a marked 
similarity to the Roman Dutch principle in inheritance matters of collation so as to ensure equitable 
distribution of an estate among the children of the deceased.
8 Although it was pointed out that each family did things slightly differently, the principle remained 
firm.
9 S6A was later incorporated as s7 into the Customary Law (Application Act) Chapter 8:05. This act 
has since been repealed by slO of the Administration of Estates Amendment Act.
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EXPLORING LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE COURTS
It is argued in this paper that there is a need to develop students research and analytical 
skills so that they can be part of the re-discovery and re-conceptualisation of customary 
law and its jurisprudence. However, a word of caution. It must not be assumed that 
rediscovery processes will always yield satisfactory results; customs and practices have 
their inherent weaknesses and flaws. But at least an overarching jurisprudential approach 
broadens the scope for dialogue around both the "good" and the "bad" elements.
One research and analysis technique to be employed is to make internal comparisons of 
customary law norms between the higher and lower courts (Dengu-Zvobgo et al, 1994). 
Field research revealed that Magistrates courts which are charged with administering the 
intestate estates of deceased "Africans" frequently had a broader and more pragmatic 
approach to the distribution of such estates than the Supreme Court. Magistrates hearing 
disputes in terms of the then s69 of the Administration of Estates Act, Chapter 301, through 
their discussions with the families of the deceased person were alive to the nuances of 
local Customary Law and would make similar determinations to those outlined above. 
On some occasions these decisions were reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court in favour 
of eldest sons. However, there is evidence that many of these distributions were happily 
accepted by families and not appealed. It was also evident that the Magistrates continued 
to apply the local customs and practices.
The Supreme Court continues to employ a constructed version of custom that has been 
built up through precedent and has not re-engaged with custom on the ground even though 
the customary law application and ascertainment statute makes it possible for this to take 
place.10 However, it rarely takes place. The Supreme Court merely looks to what the 
precedent system has constructed as the customary law (Dengu-Zvobgo et al; Zim, 1994; 
Stewart and Ncube, 1997).
The data that was emerging from court determinations alone raised questions as to the 
nature, form and content of the customary law. The crucial question then became whether 
the customary law as applied by the superior courts is an authentic version of custom that 
merits the authoritative treatment it receives? Was it an historical anachronism, ossified 
and inappropriate or perhaps a distorted creature that the senior judiciary applied for 
want of available alternatives.
LEGAL PLURALISM: A CRITICAL METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The convergence of research, analysis and teaching made it impossible to avoid the 
pervasiveness of legal pluralism and the significance of the reglementary power of semi 
autonomous social fields in inheritance matters (Falk Moore, 1983). A research and teaching 
framework based on legal pluralism means that multiple skills had to be developed for 
our own use and then transferred to students. This framework combined normative analysis 
of the law, both general law and the formal aspects of customary law, and anthropological 
techniques in uncovering the customary norms at the level of the people. How these norms 
operated and were influenced by and influenced the law in its formal operation also had 
to be explored.
10 See the discussion earlier in this paper on s9 of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act, Chapter 
7:05.
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Procedural issues, it transpired, had to be considered simultaneously with those of the 
substantive content of custom as it operated on the ground. The composition of decision 
making bodies within families was of critical importance as were the composition of chief's 
dares. Women's voices, although muted, were not absent from such councils. The role of 
vatete, in Shona societies, was critical at all stages of inheritance decisions. Such women 
were often the source of family genealogies, and had the last word if not the final decision 
when it came to how estates should be divided and allocated. The same could be said of 
women in Ndebele societies.
Time frames for decision making were often protracted, especially in inheritance matters, 
with time for negotiation and exploration of options. A year's moratorium between a death 
and a kurova guva ceremony or umbuyiso ceremony, at which distribution of substantive 
property and future plans for the widow were made, gave time for informed and careful 
decision making. What emerged from this procedural investigation was confirmatory 
evidence of the underlying concerns of these bodies for the remnant families of the deceased.
Apart from the juxtaposition of various official and formal versions of customs and practices, 
such as those advanced by the chiefs, there is a need to conduct a more broad based enquiry 
into the functioning and operation of customs and practices on the ground. A truly gender 
sensitive approach to the research process is a necessary prerequisite in uncovering 
customary jurisprudence. The next question technique and exploring the values that inform 
decisions is critical if an understanding of how customs and practices are shaped is to be 
realised. Likewise it is not enough to unpack just the content of custom. The procedural 
aspects, who participates in decision making, how decisions are made, are all vital elements 
in the reconceptualisation and reinterpretation process.
VALUES, NORMS — CUSTOMS, PRINCIPLES
One of the major criticisms of the earlier collections of customs was that the sources were 
elderly males in positions of power who colluded with the colonial governments and 
missionaries to exclude women and young males from power and resources (Chanock, 
1985; Rwezaura et al; Armstrong et al). Current attempts to re-view custom from a grounded 
perspective must avoid the possibility of similar criticisms and cast more widely for versions 
and interpretations of custom. As Holleman recounts, the official versions of custom may 
not accord with the actual application of the principles of customary law on the ground 
(Holleman, 1973). Thus it is important to uncover the actual practices in the field, especially 
as they affect women. Interviews with persons who had experienced inheritance problems 
and inheritance non-problems generally triangulated with the views that were expressed 
by the chiefs and other local figures. Women's ways of manipulating the system and the 
processes also spoke to the entitlements women have and their ways of accessing them. 
Women's entitlements did not fit into the Hohfeldian rights framework but this did not 
make them any the less rights that were enforceable (For a fuller discussion of this see 
Stewart, 1997; Mbatha, 1997).
However, it is not of itself sufficient merely to allege that a few interviews indicate that 
customs and practices have developed or evolved in a particular direction. There needs to 
be a systematic process through which the reconceptualisation of customary law is explored 
and its jurisprudence charted. Finding ways to triangulate the results from different sources 
in the field and build up holograms of customs and practices and their reflection of general 
principles is a key part of the new approach to teaching customary law. As each finding 
triangulates with the other perceptions and understandings of customs a hologram is built
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piece by piece from local values, through their translation into norms, practices and 
procedures and on into the more pervasive principles that imbue customary law and shape 
its jurisprudence.
Individuals when "cross examined" on issues around inheritance would describe what 
they considered from a cultural and family position to be important. Whether these same 
values emerged at the level of normative orderings of civil society was the next quest. If 
communities told you that "in our culture" for example the welfare of the wife and children 
in inheritance is paramount, this might be described as a value. If families, as a matter of 
practice, consistently administered estates in favour of women and children then the value 
was translated into action as a custom or a norm. In such situations community values 
were triangulating with norms and custom.
The next investigation was to determine whether further up the chain of adjudication within 
the customary frameworks it was possible to identify such values and norms at the level of 
principles that governed dispute resolutions. Chiefs, as discussed above, when asked how 
they would determine such issues, or had done so,11 indicated that the primary concern 
was for the welfare of the children in particular and for the wife or wives of a deceased 
man, or in the case of a woman for the children and the husband. Likewise Magistrates at 
the lower end of the judicial scale, in constant touch with local customs and practices, were 
also responding to the principles of customary law that were located within the community.
Importantly this was not just a few random findings but a whole process of triangulated 
findings as to the underlying principles of customary law across a wide spectrum of society 
and from different decision making fora. To continue uncritically teaching the Supreme 
Court's version of the customary law of inheritance, or for that matter without further 
research in any area of customary law, would be unsupportable.
TEACHING CUSTOMARY LAW?
This paper thus proposes that what ought to be focused on in teaching "Customary Law" 
are the methodologies to assist students, the future researchers and practitioners to 
transcend the rule bound versions of custom. An understanding of the gap between the 
customary law in the books and the dynamic situation, sensitive versions of customs and 
practices that were found among the people, also needs to be fostered. Students need to 
know how to broaden the parameters of the debates about custom with traditional leaders 
and the community at laige beyond the oppression discourse to that of values. This is a 
liberating debate for all parties, as when the social value or customary principle is raised it 
is possible to ask: "How would you deal with the needs of the family under particular 
circumstances?" What if there is no son? What if the widow works in town and the couple 
had acquired the house together in an urban area?" The next question technique is pursued 
with the confidence and an informed dialogue conducted.
Calculating the risk, which at the time was a very significant risk, of asking the Chiefs, 
what was the relevant principle of custom in inheritance matters was possible because 
there was a background of knowledge and concomitant courage to dialogue, built up 
through an alternative construction of customary law to that in the minds of the Ministry 
of Justice Officials. This is also a useful skill in the event that there is resistance to necessary
11 This needed to be posed as a hypothetical question as Chiefs did not have jurisdiction in such matters. 
However, that they would intervene in matters was common knowledge. Thus it was a concrete 
hypothetical question.
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transformative reforms of customary law and dialogue with the wider society is needed to 
"market" the reforms.
FINDING THE GATEWAYS
Having traversed the empirical field the next methodological challenge becomes to channel 
the findings at their various levels back through the gateways of the law, into the courts, 
into the law reform processes and into the "textbook" constructions of the Customary law 
(Dengu-Zvobgo et a l, 1994). It is here that the teaching has to re-engage with the field of 
"law games", while at the same time ensuring that the open ended frameworks remain 
and that principles are the focus of the research process not ossified end product rules.
Students need to be guided in the process of constructing the arguments to present to the 
courts, the legislators and administrators as to why these new interpretations of customary 
law have credence and should and can displace the old ossified versions. At the level of 
formal "law games" identifying the legislation that allows for the admission of customary 
law is a key task. Further, the parameters for its admission have to be investigated and the 
skills to cast the admission and content arguments in appropriate formats have to be actively 
taught.
CONCLUSION
Thus although in my teaching I cannot ignore the ossified Customary Law in the books I 
am compelled to go beyond those versions and explore the underlying principles in the 
customs and practices of a people. Such an approach must also contain a section on the 
development of critical skills in the analysis of the customary law in its many locations 
and guises.
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